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Abstract
Background: National malaria control programmes must deal with the complex process of changing
national malaria treatment guidelines, often without guidance on the process of change. Selecting a
replacement drug is only one issue in this process. There is a paucity of literature describing successful
malaria treatment policy changes to help guide control programs through this process.
Objectives: To understand the wider context in which national malaria treatment guidelines were
formulated in a specific country (Peru).
Methods: Using qualitative methods (individual and focus group interviews, stakeholder analysis and a
review of documents), a retrospective analysis of the process of change in Peru's anti-malarial treatment
policy from the early 1990's to 2003 was completed.
Results: The decision to change Peru's policies resulted from increasing levels of anti-malarial drug
resistance, as well as complaints from providers that the drugs were no longer working. The context of
the change occurred in a time in which Peru was changing national governments, which created extreme
challenges in moving the change process forward. Peru utilized a number of key strategies successfully to
ensure that policy change would occur. This included a) having the process directed by a group who shared
a common interest in malaria and who had long-established social and professional networks among
themselves, b) engaging in collaborative teamwork among nationals and between nationals and
international collaborators, c) respect for and inclusion of district-level staff in all phases of the process,
d) reliance on high levels of technical and scientific knowledge, e) use of standardized protocols to collect
data, and f) transparency.
Conclusion: Although not perfectly or fully implemented by 2003, the change in malaria treatment policy
in Peru occurred very quickly, as compared to other countries. They identified a problem, collected the
data necessary to justify the change, utilized political will to their favor, approved the policy, and moved
to improve malaria control in their country. As such, they offer an excellent example for other countries
as they contemplate or embark on policy changes.
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Background
Throughout malaria-endemic areas, national malaria con-
trol programmes must deal with the challenges of chang-
ing malaria treatment policies in response to
unacceptably high levels of drug resistance to previously
used anti-malarial drugs, such as sulphadoxine-pyrimeth-
amine (SP). The current 'gold standard' for treatment of
uncomplicated P. falciparum malaria is use of artemisinin-
based combination therapy (ACT)[1]. While global guide-
lines offer information on the best drugs to use, there have
been only a few studies published about the process of
change in countries in which policy changes have been
made [2-9]. However, some of these studies specifically
focus on drug efficacy data as the primary issue in chang-
ing malaria treatment policies [6,10], as opposed to the
social and political components of policy change.
Selecting the most appropriate and efficacious drug is
only one of many facets of changing malaria treatment
policy. Effective policy change is a long, involved process
that extends for months to years and requires input from
a multitude of stakeholders, both public and pri-
vate[2,7,11]. Steps of the process include: a) being aware
that a change is needed, b) verifying data to ensure that a
change is required, c) presenting data in language that is
easily understood by all involved in the policy cycle, d)
advocating for the proposed change, e) fostering agree-
ment among all stakeholders that a change is required, f)
identifying policy options and selecting the most appro-
priate, g) agreeing on replacement drug/s, h) developing
consensus on timing for the change, h) developing all pol-
icy documents, i) completing all preparatory steps for
implementation, j) implementing new policy, k) moni-
toring and evaluating the change, and l) planning for next
policy cycle [2]. Some of these steps may occur simultane-
ously.
During the process, it is very important to also pay atten-
tion to economic, political, legal/regulatory, socio-behav-
ioural, environmental, and other contextual factors that
impact the process of change [2,12]. Competition for
scarce resources among various national sectors; lack of
adequate planning; national and regional political agen-
das; cost, efficacy, availability, safety and acceptability of
the replacement drug/s; ineffective communication and
limited trust between scientists and policy makers; status
of the public health care system in general; legal and reg-
ulatory statutes; fluidity of national borders; degree of
decentralization; local epidemiological context; and
vested interests of stakeholders (particularly the pharma-
ceutical industry) are examples of factors that can signifi-
cantly influence the process of drug policy formation and
implementation.
In response to growing levels of anti-malarial drug resist-
ance to chloroquine (CQ), in 1999, Peru decided to
change its national malaria treatment policy. Information
pertaining to the proposed change was published in a
document entitled "Politicas Nacionals"[13]. In 2001, a
site-specific approach to malaria treatment policy was for-
mally approved. For the Macro Región Norte (Northern
Coast), the Ministry of Health (MoH) selected the combi-
nation therapy of SP and artesunate (AS) as first-line ther-
apy. For first-line treatment in Macro Región Amazónica
(Amazon Region), the MoH chose mefloquine (MQ) and
AS. With the assistance of the Peruvian MOH and the
United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) (through the Amazon Malaria Initiative [AMI]),
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
initiated a retrospective analysis of the change in anti-
malarial treatment policy in Peru.
This paper offers a historical review of the process from
the early 1990's to early 2003, identifies factors that
assisted or hindered the process of change, summarizes
'lessons learnt,' and offers recommendations for subse-
quent changes as derived from the shared perspectives of
the various stakeholders. While most of the paper focuses
on the process surrounding the process of gaining consen-
sus for change, the drafting of the new policy and the
selection of replacement drugs, reference is also made to
issues regarding implementation, which can be thought of
as the second phase of change. Stakeholder quotes derived
during the interviews are used to illustrate concepts. The
process is primarily describing the events at the national
(central) level, with some discussion of events at the two
regional areas (Amazon Region and Northern Coast).
Methods
The study was reviewed by the Institutional Review Board
at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and
found to be exempt. Individual interviews and focus
group discussions (FGDs) were held with key stakehold-
ers who had been involved in the process of changing the
policy, primarily at the central level. The sampling frame
was created by two methods: a purposive sample was gen-
erated based on names of stakeholders that were involved
and/or had information about the process of Peru's policy
change (this initial list was compiled by Peruvian col-
leagues), and the snowball sampling technique, in which
additional persons are identified and asked to participate
based on recommendations given by persons already
interviewed. This case study also used stakeholder analysis
techniques to ensure that relevant parties were included in
the sampling frame and to understand the influences
stakeholders had on the policy process[14,15].
All interviews used a broad, open-ended approach to
gather data. The questions were focused on describing theMalaria Journal 2009, 8:85 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/85
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process of change, including describing the wider socio-
political context in which the change occurred. Following
the initial question asked: "can you please describe the proc-
ess by which policy change occurred in Peru?" other questions
were generated. Methods to obtain data also included a
participatory technique of developing a timeline of key
events (developed by consensus among stakeholders) and
reviewing documents pertaining to the change in policy.
The research team wrote extensive field notes during the
interviews and compared their notes after each interview
to ensure accuracy and completeness. Verbatim quotes are
used in this paper to illustrate concepts or points of view.
Content analysis was used to analyse the qualitative data.
Verbatim notes from the interviews were coded, from
which themes and categories were identified. Individual
interview data were compared to focus group findings.
During one focus group discussion, all participants were
asked to generate a timeline of key events. Using the indi-
vidual timelines, a "master" timeline was developed. Any
specific individual data that did not match with the mas-
ter data were discussed with the entire group and either
added to the master timeline or a reason was given for
why it was not considered a key event. All participants in
the focus group consensually agreed upon the master time
line.
The researchers reviewed copies of all documents that
related to the process of change to verify dates/events that
had been described in the interviews. Lastly, a draft of the
report and findings was presented to some of the key
stakeholders. Stakeholders raised issues for clarification
and mutually agreed upon the findings as presented by
the researcher, with minor edits.
Findings
Sample
Thirteen individual and four focus group discussions were
conducted during two visits to Lima, Peru (February and
July, 2003). A 14th individual interview was conducted as
a phone interview in Spanish, with the transcript of the
call translated into English, as the participant had not
been available during the visits to Peru. Most interviews
were done in a combination of Spanish and English, with
translation provided as needed.
Individual interview participants were from various
organizations: Ministry of Health (MoH) (n = 4), private
consultants (n = 2, both of whom were former MoH staff),
donor agencies (n = 3, all of whom were prior MoH staff),
international technical/policy agency (n = 1, prior MoH
staff), a non-governmental organization (NGO) (n = 1,
also part of MoH staff), media representatives (n = 2) and
a pharmaceutical manufacturing representative (n = 1).
Focus group discussions represented key stakeholders,
including participants from the MoH staff, World Health
Organization regional staff, Department level (DISA)
staff, NGO and donor representatives. Some participants
were involved in both individual and focus group discus-
sions. Triangulating the data by obtaining information by
both individual and FGDs interviews served as a way to
clarify perceptions, verify the data in general, and obtain
consensus on the key events and the timing of those
events. One focus group specifically focused on the North-
ern Coast provincial (DISA) level, as local DISA staff were
in Lima during the time of the study. For the Amazon
Region, specific questions were asked of various partici-
pants who had previously worked in that area during the
time of the change, particularly those who had assisted
with building local capacity as a result of the process of
change.
Historical narrative
The process of changing the Peruvian anti-malarial treat-
ment policy evolved over numerous years and involved a
host of stakeholders (Additional file 1). In addition to
changing patterns in drug efficacy, environmental and
political influences affected the process. The following
historical narrative reflects what the participants in this
retrospective analysis perceived as the most important
events and factors that influenced the change in Peru's
anti-malarial treatment policy.
Unlike most African countries, historically, Peru's malaria
problem was primarily focused on non-falciparum
malaria (before 1990, Plasmodium falciparum cases
accounted for less than 1% of all cases). In 1990, the
number of cases of P. falciparum began to increase. At that
time, first-line treatment for uncomplicated malaria was
CQ, with quinine (QN) used to treat the few failures that
had been seen.
In the early 1990's, no one was alarmed even though, as
early as 1991, clinicians were noticing that CQ had
stopped working in some parts of Loreto. As a focus group
participant described:
"Malaria resistance wasn't perceived as a problem. We
assumed drugs would work fine for a long time. The process
begins when there is sensitization to a potential problem,
not when you have efficacy results."
At this point in time, there were no widespread standard-
ized efforts to document the perceived changes in efficacy,
although a small study was completed that documented
the increased levels of resistance[16]. Efficacy data were
being collected using non-standardized efficacy trials. In
the Amazon Region, a decision was made at the DISA level
to use SP as the first line, in spite of it being the second-Malaria Journal 2009, 8:85 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/85
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line drug in the official policy. Data were presented to the
central level and the Director General (DG) made a visit
to the region. Although there were inconsistencies in the
data from the DISA and central levels, the DG approved
use of SP. This decision was then revoked at the central
level, with instructions given to regional directors to
return to using CQ as first line therapy. Local officials felt
that this change was a big mistake and would only make
resistance worse.
A regional malaria meeting was held in Venezuela during
1994 that emphasized themes from the WHO Global
Strategy for Malaria: detection, diagnosis, and treat-
ment[1]. However, due to inadequate resources, Peru
directed its control efforts toward treatment and not pre-
vention.
In 1994, an operational monitoring system for drug resist-
ance was started by the Peruvian National Malaria Control
Programme (NMCP). As part of this, health services began
to offer directly observed therapy for malaria, and started
a 28-day follow up for all patients diagnosed with malaria
(data from this monitoring programme was referred to as
'cohort' data) [10]. Around the same time, the tradition-
ally vertical NMCP became integrated within the general
health services[10]. Whether this shift away from vertical
programming was beneficial or not was debated among
the interviewed stakeholders. Those who supported the
change felt that it focused the problem of malaria more
directly at the health care services level, meaning that pre-
scribers were more acutely aware of malaria and could
more easily see trends in drug resistance. Those opposed
to the change perceived that 'malaria control' was only
limited to case management and ignored prevention.
They also felt that malaria technical expertise was lacking
in the general health services and worried that critical
areas, such as vector control, would be ignored.
Clinician reports of increasing CQ failures began to
emerge from two areas: the northern coastal plain area
and the Amazon region. 'Cohort data' indicated failure
rates of up to 30% but the data were not perceived as reli-
able or rigorous and were treated with skepticism due to
problems of enrollment, incomplete coverage and failure
to use standardized protocols. By 1996, there was a steep
increase in the overall number of malaria cases, with the
proportion of P. falciparum increasing. Malaria cases
increased four-fold in Peru from 1992–97 and 50-fold in
the Amazon area of the Loreto Department[17]. By the
end of 1997 and during early 1998, the weather phenom-
enon, El Niño, produced increased rain and flooding, fol-
lowed by an outbreak of malaria on the northern coastal
plain[18]. Due to the concern about increasing levels of
anti-malarial drug resistance, in 1996, SP became the first-
line treatment for uncomplicated malaria in Loreto (Cen-
tral Amazon) and the Brazilian border area of the Eastern
Amazon.
The increase in malaria cases in the Amazon Region in
1997 resulted in five Director Generals (DG) visiting the
Loreto area in order to develop a plan of action. Unfortu-
nately, most of the DGs left before decisions were reached
on how to proceed. However, in the eastern Amazon
region, SP was replaced with a 7-day course of QN and tet-
racycline in 1997[10].
A former NMCP staff member noted that they [NMCP]
had heard about resistance in other countries and had
even planned ahead for the eventual possibility of the
need to change anti-malarials. In reality, few people were
ready for the speed in which events occurred.
"We thought and planned ahead, had it in mind that we
might have to switch to other anti-malarials. However, we
did not think that the need to change would come so
quickly. This caused us to be about two years behind in
starting drug efficacy studies."
A consequence of this was that there was prominent
media coverage focused on the increasing number of
malaria cases and the desire for insecticide spraying, as
this had been an effective strategy when used previously.
The media coverage sharpened the awareness of the com-
munity, the NMCP, and physicians within the MoH about
the resurgence in malaria. The press accused the MoH of
not doing enough to prevent and control the problem.
The response by the MoH was directed toward placing the
responsibility back at the provincial level, rather than the
central level, although no additional resources were
released to the DISA level to help with the epidemic situ-
ation. Ministry of Health staff felt that the Northern Coast
was well prepared to deal with El Niño. However, others
felt that El Niño overwhelmed the capacity of the MoH at
that time, although the situation improved with time.
During this time, the MoH perceived their relationship
with the media as positive and 'open.' These sentiments
stood in stark contrast to others who stated that the MoH
reacted defensively to the criticisms leveled and failed to
provide adequate figures that described the situation.
During this period of time, events at both the global and
regional level occurred that would impact the situation in
Peru. At the global level, the World Health Organization
(WHO) published a standard protocol for conducting
malaria drug efficacy trials. Use of this protocol would
later assist in improving efficacy data collection. At the
regional level, WHO/Pan-American Health Organization
(PAHO) conducted an external evaluation of the Peruvian
programme, releasing a statement saying that the malaria
control strategies employed by the MoH were appropriateMalaria Journal 2009, 8:85 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/85
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in response to El Niño and should be supported by the
Ministry of Health. Provided as a press release to all the
major newspapers, the statement was seen as an interna-
tional endorsement of the efforts of the Ministry.
As well, stakeholder interests in anti-malarial drug resist-
ance and emerging infectious diseases began to meld[10].
Collaborative relationships began among different agen-
cies: the Peruvian Instituto Nacional de Salud (INS) [the
institution within the Peruvian Ministry of Health that is
responsible for public health research and training],
USAID, CDC, United States Naval Medical Research Insti-
tute Detachment (NAMRID), and the Loreto DISA.
In March 1998, PAHO held a meeting in Manaus, Brazil
to discuss revision of the WHO standardized drug efficacy
protocol, in order to make it more appropriate for use in
the Amazon Region. The meeting was attended by a vari-
ety of people including INS representatives, staff from the
NMCP, faculty from the School of Public Health and
CDC. After returning from the meeting, the group was
able to convince the director of the INS that the issue was
important. A decision was also made to adopt 'lot quality
assurance' (LQA) sampling for their cohort data, which
was seen as a critical strategy for standardized sampling.
Following the PAHO meeting, a September meeting was
held in Lima to further discuss standardized efficacy pro-
tocols. At this meeting, there was tension between univer-
sity researchers who felt that this type of research needed
to be academically based (with patients hospitalized for
follow-up) versus using operational research from within
the control program, assisted by the national research
institution. Agreement was reached on using the WHO
standardized drug efficacy protocols, particularly after rec-
ognition of the usefulness of lot sampling. As a result, by
using LQA, the researchers decreased their variability
across the samples; thus, improving their data.
In 1998, a key event occurred that would prove to be ben-
eficial to the process of changing treatment guidelines.
The "VIGIA Project," which had the political support of
the Minister of Health and financial support from USAID,
was conceived as a five-year project to strengthen national
and local capacity to identify, control and prevent emerg-
ing and re-emerging infectious diseases more effectively.
An important feature of this project was that the VIGIA
implementing partner was the Peruvian MoH, which then
designated a National Team responsible for activities that
would report at the Vice-Ministerial level. The Project
worked closely with other major MoH divisions, as well as
outside partners. As such, it was able to play a critical role
in promoting collaboration among partners and stake-
holders throughout the policy process in Peru. The mem-
bership of the project team included colleagues that had
worked together for many years in malaria. The strength
of these social and professional networks enhanced the
Project's ability to interact effectively with the malaria
control programme.
During this time, a protocol for research to inform the
change in treatment guideline process began to be devel-
oped by staff from the INS. It soon became clear that the
various involved agencies held differing perspectives as to
how the research should be done and who should be
responsible for the research. As INS was developing the
protocol, they felt as though they should be the ones to
conduct the research, although they lacked the funds to
do so. The NMCP had the mandate to do the research but
had some trepidation about moving forward for fear of
the results. There was concern that if the findings indi-
cated a high level of resistance, there would be criticism
leveled at them that they had not done their job properly.
They also lacked funding for research and were not pre-
pared to change the drugs should the results require that
action. Despite the situation of having multiple organiza-
tions involved that, at times, had different objectives,
these stakeholders were able to align their interests and
join efforts in order to develop research protocols that
would help in moving the development of the new anti-
malarial drug policy forward.
As well, discussions ensued over the use of the new stand-
ardized WHO drug efficacy protocol versus using an older
one. Ultimately, the newer one was adopted and imple-
mented. Capacity building started with VIGIA providing
partial funding for research and training and one
researcher from Peru received funding from CDC to travel
to Atlanta for further training. Through an epidemiology
training program, an additional 39 people acquired more
epidemiology skills. As well, during this time, a national
network of laboratories was promoted through the
National Laboratory.
Throughout this time, staff from the DISAs were included
in regularly held Task Force meetings in both Lima and
Iquitos (largest city in the Peruvian Amazon area). By
including DISA staff during all phases of the process (from
data collection through analysis and dissemination), they
built local capacity. As one MoH official noted:
"They became part of the solution if there were problems."
Efficacy trials were conducted by INS in the Iquitos area
on CQ and SP, in collaboration with CDC. Health profes-
sionals began to voice concerns about increased anti-
malarial drug resistance.
'Cohort studies' continued and the DISA data given to the
NMCP were indicating growing levels of resistance. In JulyMalaria Journal 2009, 8:85 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/85
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1998, a team from the INS presented their preliminary
results from the efficacy trials to their partners and the sci-
entific community, with results demonstrating more
resistance to both CQ and SP. By September 1998, a deci-
sion was made to replace SP with QN and tetracycline,
although this never was implemented until early
2000[10].
In 1999, results from standardized efficacy studies were
demonstrating resistance levels of greater than 30% to CQ
but not SP in Northern Coast areas. The results were
important in demonstrating not only high resistance lev-
els, but also that there were differences between the two
eco-systems, thus requiring a site-specific policy. In June
of 1999, SP was chosen for the first-line therapy for P. faci-
parum infections in the areas of the Northern Coast.
Politically, during this time, there was a key stakeholder
within the Ministry who had direct access to the Minister.
Having this person directly linked to the Minister allowed
the involved stakeholders to informally channel messages
about the need for malaria treatment policy change to a
top political figure.
During 1999, the first draft document discussing the need
for change, 'Politicas Nacionals,' was drafted and circu-
lated after standardized efficacy results were discussed
with stakeholders[13]. This document only reflected pre-
liminary decisions, noting that there would be a change in
anti-malarial treatment policy, without specifying which
drugs would be used as the replacement drugs. It outlined
necessary steps for the change in policy, urged drug effi-
cacy testing of new drugs, and discussed general drug
requirements, including issues like drug safety, need for
simplicity, acceptance and compliance. The MoH offi-
cially endorsed this policy protocol on October 15th,
1999.
Prior to official sanctioning, to promote advocacy for the
change, the Peruvians used a strategy not seen in the other
countries. They held an open meeting in the capital city of
Lima in August 1999, inviting all stakeholders to discuss
the draft protocol. They also presented drug efficacy
results from seven sentinel sites. Rather than using the
external technical experts who had assisted with the stud-
ies to present the data, the provincial level staff presented
the findings. This increased the DISA-level sense of own-
ership of the process. Simple graphs were presented to dis-
play the increasing levels of malaria-related morbidity and
mortality and technical jargon was removed so that non-
technical people could understand the messages.
In conjunction with the open meeting described above,
they conducted an open evening seminar, directed toward
the public, which had been publicized through a quarter
page advertisement in the major newspapers (resulting in
attendance of about 300 people). At this forum, the topic
of discussion first centered on the problem of resistance
globally, moved to the status of resistance within Latin
America and, finally, narrowed to the problems seen in
Peru. To support their arguments for possibly introducing
combination therapy, they discussed experiences from SE
Asia as a reference point. External partners presented this
information. Using technical experts with international
experience in malaria strengthened and supported the
credibility of what the national experts were saying.
As well, those involved in the change recognized the need
for supplemental economic data to support the drug effi-
cacy results. They conducted an analysis of the economic
burden of the problem and presented findings as the costs
to the nation as a whole, rather than solely as costs to the
MoH. They included factors such as loss of production
from work absences and indirect costs related to malaria.
Efficacy testing on anti-malarial combination therapies
continued until June 2000, when it was decided that suf-
ficient data had been gathered to document levels of effi-
cacy and safety. A decision was made to initiate a formal
system for monitoring resistance, which would incorpo-
rate surveillance data from the cohort data and use of sen-
tinel sites. The official policy, outlining the replacement
drugs for the site-specific treatment guidelines, was
announced in June 2000. The team involved in the proc-
ess gave the following recommendations for combination
therapy to be used as temporary measures against uncom-
plicated P. falciparum: a) Northern Coast: SP/AS and b)
Amazon Region: QN and tetracycline (or MQ/AS). Preg-
nant women would be treated with QN and clindamycin
and children under eight would use the combination of
QN and clindamycin. Additional drug efficacy studies
would be conducted and the replacement drugs would be
selected based on those data.
Letters were sent out to the provincial levels, explaining
that there had been a national decision to change malaria
treatment policy, although no date was set for when drugs
might reach the periphery. Initially the provincial level
voiced resistance to the protocol, noting that a major con-
straint was insufficient funds to purchase new drugs. Their
responses reflected the political orientation of the country
at that time. The Fujimori government was in the last
months of power and there was pressure from the govern-
ment for the provincial levels to decrease expenditures.
Officials were being jailed for over-expenditures; thus,
there was reticence to agreeing to a measure that would
increase costs. A call for tender proposals for anti-malari-
als was issued to national suppliers but the process was
slow due to continued fear of reprisals for spending funds.
However, the new anti-malarials were incorporated intoMalaria Journal 2009, 8:85 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/85
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the national formulary and replacement drug purchasing
began with the out-going government.
In 2001, using cascade training, the national team trained
physicians and nurses from six regions on the new treat-
ment policy, followed by the DISA-level staff training dis-
trict-level workers, with some support from the Ministry.
Although the focus was on the Northern Coast and Ama-
zon regions, other areas affected by labor migration were
also included. The budget for training was not clearly
defined and available, which delayed implementation.
Historically, in the previous vertical programme, all
malaria-related training was assumed and paid for by the
NMCP. With decentralization, DISA-level budgets were
not adjusted to account for the necessary training. Luckily,
there was some supplemental funding from VIGIA availa-
ble for training.
Although the training materials were developed at central
level, the DISAs distributed the materials. It was noted
that there was limited diffusion of training materials at the
local level, particularly in the Amazon region, where
transport of materials by river proved to be a major chal-
lenge. There was some criticism of the way training was
conducted, with some stakeholders noting that the MoH
did not have the capacity to provide adequate training;
thus, the universities should have been more involved. To
counter this, other stakeholders noted that the universities
had been invited on numerous occasions to participate
and chose not to become engaged in the process. The gen-
eral consensus was that training and the production of
Information, Education and Communication (IEC) mate-
rials needed to be improved.
There was also a strong recognition that drug resistance
was a regional problem, particularly due to the high rates
of cross-border migration that occurs between Peru and its
neighbouring countries of Ecuador, Columbia, Brazil and
Bolivia. As part of regional efforts to standardize and coor-
dinate drug efficacy testing, the Peruvian MoH went to
Bolivia to train 60 physicians in drug efficacy monitoring
in 2001.
While focusing on the importance of regional approaches,
the key stakeholders also never lost sight of the need for
country-level data. As a former Director General noted:
"Theoretically, you can know geographical distributions,
epidemiological and other influences from other countries,
but the population wants it specific to their own country.
People are wary and do not want an experiment from
another country."
By this time, the transitional government had been
formed and elections were held in July 2001. At the very
end of the transitional government, the new officials in
the Ministry of Health agreed to the change in policy and
on August 7th, 2001, the Director General of "People's
Health" department signed a revised national malaria
treatment policy, which outlined the first-, second- and
third-line anti-malarials to be used for the treatment of
uncomplicated  P. falciparum malaria[19]. The revised
guidelines followed the previous recommendations for
the site-specific combination therapies. The MoH
announced the change in the major newspapers a day
after the official signing ceremony.
Although training had started, drugs were not yet availa-
ble. The transition government had not wanted to pur-
chase the new anti-malarials, as the process initiated by
the Fujimori government was perceived as corrupt. Pur-
chasing drugs started again in September/October 2001,
although it was a very slow process. By late 2001, the first
batches of the new drugs were brought to the critical areas
and the new treatment policy was officially implemented
in November 2001[10]. 'Cohort studies' continued as a
matter of routine operational business by the control pro-
gramme.
Due to the loss of staff resulting from a change in the gov-
ernment, re-training had to occur, starting in August 2002.
Regional-level teams conducted the trainings, with sup-
port from the central programme. Evaluation of the
implementations was initially planned for 2002 but, since
implementation had stalled, it was rescheduled for later in
2003 (Figure 1).
Political context
The wider political context affected the process of policy
change in Peru. With each change in government, officials
changed within the Ministry of Health. Initially, with the
transitional government, there was extremely close scru-
tiny of all activities, and fear of using funds for procure-
ment of drugs and supplies was widespread. This resulted
in procurements being halted, affecting not only anti-
malarials, but also vaccines and insecticides. As men-
tioned earlier, the tender for anti-malarials was issued in
2001, but the process was slow. By the time procurement
occurred in 2002, a crisis point had been reached, as sup-
plies fell below the critical level. One focus group
described this period as:
"Political will was there, but there were no drugs!"
There were strategies in place whereby PAHO could have
assisted with procurement, but the Peruvian government
made no such request. Some provincial departments were
able to purchase drugs from their own budgets, but this
was not consistently done. As a donor representative
described:Malaria Journal 2009, 8:85 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/85
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"There was paralysis in the entire Ministry and it was hard
to deal with."
Generally, procurement was not on schedule during the
transitional period and specific items were not included in
the budget. By December 2002, the drugs had arrived to
the level of the health services and coverage was good by
January 2003. As of February 2003, there were sufficient
supplies to last until June 2003. As well, an agreement was
reached to allow PAHO to purchase drugs, effective in
2004.
Loss of capacity
The changes in government clearly had a negative impact
on the level of trained personnel available and continuity
within the control programme. It was felt that the new
governments perceived anyone who had worked in the
Fujimori government as being corrupt, resulting in many
technical staff members losing from their positions. Each
time a new government came into power, the MoH
endured a tremendous loss of human resources that had
solid technical experience in public health. For example,
during 2002, one endemic region lost 25 out of 37 work-
ers assigned to malaria control. As a donor described the
impact of staff loss:
"The problem is that in many places the staff is not good
enough to make technical or operational decisions."
Another former Director General in the MoH noted:
"You cannot work with peace in your mind if you don't
know that you'll have a job."
Many health staff that had been trained in the initial cas-
cade training lost their jobs. This increased the complexity
of implementation as new workers needed to be trained,
which was particularly difficult in the remote Amazon
region.
Identification of opportunities
Recognition that local capacity could be developed to
assist in the process was another key factor in moving the
process forward. Not only was local capacity developed in
terms of monitoring drug efficacy, DISA level staff gained
experience in dealing directly with the central level, which
Key events in changing Peru's anti-malarial drug policy Figure 1
Key events in changing Peru's anti-malarial drug policy.
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-Implementation 
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resulted in the central level becoming more receptive to a
shift of power to the local level.
They also recognized that it was very useful to identify and
capitalize on environmental or political events occurring
that might provide additional support for the change in
policy. For example, El Niño was an event that could not
have been planned in advance to coincide with the need
to change policy, yet it served to stimulate interest in their
cause. As one INS staff member stated:
"You need to seize the moment and opportunities to make
things happen."
In addition to the local events, global discourse about the
threat of increasing resistance helped to sensitize people
to the immediate problem Peru was facing, as well as what
it meant regionally. PAHO used the example of events in
Africa as an impetus for change, which lent support to the
process in Peru.
As well, the NMCP recognized that the Health Commis-
sion in Parliament was very interested in malaria, as phy-
sicians from the Amazon region were members of this
commission. As these members had a vested interest in
improving malaria care in their home areas, the NMCP
utilized this opportunity to obtain support for the needed
policy changes by providing them malaria information.
Other opportunities that assisted the process included
funding from VIGIA and NAMRID. Although the objec-
tives of NAMRID were not necessarily consistent with the
NMCP or the INS, their common research interests pro-
vided additional funding.
Challenges to overcome
Throughout the process, stakeholders were consistent in
describing the challenges that they faced. Initially, there
was internal reluctance within the NMCP to recognize
that the time had come when it was necessary to change
anti-malarials.
Frequent changes in the ruling government created seri-
ous problems that affected the process of change. These
included: a) loss of historical memory that made the proc-
ess fragmented, b) limited human resources due to politi-
cal changes, with simultaneous loss of both policy makers
and technical staff, c) difficulties with malaria-specific
decision-making due to loss of technical expertise, d)
unstable health systems with insufficient number of
workers dedicated to malaria, e) heightened anxieties
from health care workers about career stability, and f)
uncertainties about budget allocations and the ability to
fund the needed changes secondary to fears of political
reprisals. As one MoH staff member commented:
"Once the budget was defined, there was no clear definition
of what it implied. There was an idea that it would cost
more but how much more was not clear."
Lessons learned
Stakeholders were asked to reflect on the entire process of
malaria policy change in Peru in order to identify key les-
sons learned. The following list, not prioritized in any
order, represents what the stakeholders felt were the most
salient 'lessons learned':
a) Engage all stakeholders at the beginning of the
process.
b) Promote change through the use of rigorous scien-
tific data.
c) Orient scientific data toward malaria control needs,
rather than the needs/interests of the researchers.
d) Make use of existing opportunities or create oppor-
tunities to put malaria on the political agenda.
e) Demonstrate to policy makers that it makes good
economic sense to change policy: show the effect of
not doing something. Focus discussions regarding
cost-benefits to the general population, rather than
only to the Ministry of Health.
f) Present data with the support of international tech-
nical experts, which strengthens the credibility of
national researchers.
g) Always present solutions when presenting prob-
lems to policy makers.
h) Develop an implementation plan with someone
higher placed in the MoH than the NMCP, who has
direct access to policy makers.
i) Ensure all systems and supplies are in place before
attempting implementation so that scarce resources
are not wasted.
j) Develop policy in a collaborative manner and share
experiences with neighboring countries.
In additional to identifying "lessons learned," stakehold-
ers were asked what advice they could offer others who are
starting the daunting process of changing their anti-malar-
ial drug policies. The following recommendations were
offered:Malaria Journal 2009, 8:85 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/85
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a) Use an integrated team approach and recognize
from the beginning that your work will lead to a
change in drug policy – identify your end goals.
b) Conduct periodic monitoring for drug resistance
and develop good surveillance systems.
c) Obtain assurance from the administrative side that
they will work in tandem with the technical partners,
particularly in the context of decentralization.
d) Evaluate policies constantly to identify existing
problems and to look ahead.
e) In the context of decentralization, provide technical
support to district/regional levels as needed.
f) Promote regional approaches to policy formulation.
g) Focus donors on the goals of the country:
"In order to have success, individual donors should have
one objective, which is to help Peru, not their own objec-
tives!" (quote from international technical agency)
h) Utilize the principles of strategic planning, particu-
larly in the area of drug management (procuring
appropriate levels of drugs in a timely manner and dis-
tribution of the drugs peripherally).
Discussion
In spite of the political turmoil and environmental
changes, the Peruvians utilized a number of strategies suc-
cessfully to ensure that policy change would occur. The
process was driven by a group of individuals who pos-
sessed a common interest in malaria and the political will
to move the process forward in a fairly uniform fashion.
Although the ruling government experienced major tran-
sitions throughout this process, the key stakeholders pro-
vided continuity and institutional memory in the face of
a government that could not offer such stability.
Key elements included: a) teamwork among individuals
from diverse agencies, b) trust and linkages among team
members from previous years of working together as col-
leagues, c) respect for and inclusion of regional and dis-
trict level health care workers in a decision situated at the
central level, d) demonstrated high levels of technical and
scientific knowledge, e) use of globally sanctioned stand-
ardized protocols for data collection, and f) transparency
in the process. As with other countries that have recently
modified their malaria treatment policies[9], Peru used
the strength of collaborative relationships among stake-
holders to their benefit. Those networks were, in part,
driven by both current and previous NMCP staff mem-
bers.
They capitalized on movement of key individuals upward
within the Ministry of Health, who could be strong advo-
cates for the change. They pushed the proposed policy
changes forward through using political pressure from a
former Head of the NMCP, who was promoted to the level
of General Directorate. The process was strengthened also
through collaborative relationships with global partners.
Lastly, they stressed the idea that the process was a "win
win" situation, resulting in effective drugs being dis-
pensed and local and national capacity strengthened
(Additional file 2).
The strategies employed by the Peruvians mirrored factors
identified in the literature that promote improved take-up
of research by policy makers and enhance rational policy
formulation. These include: a) exchange of information
on a regular basis between scientists and policy makers, b)
ensuring that policies are informed by sound scientific
information, c) early and continuous engagement of
stakeholders at all levels (from national to peripheral), d)
timeliness and local relevance of the research, e) identifi-
cation of key networks that may influence decision mak-
ing, and f) understanding the complicated context in
which policy formulation and implementation resides,
including both the process of decision making and the
formal/informal channels of power[2,7-9,20-27].
Determining the best, most sustainable and practical pol-
icy is only one early step in the process of drug policy
change. Implementation follows the establishment of
policy and can be a daunting task for NMCPs. Although
issues related to implementation were only touched on
briefly in this paper, the challenges identified by the Peru-
vians (such as problems with financing and procurement
of the replacement drugs, loss of staff, etc) were not
unique to Peru. A recent paper from Kenya noted that it
took over 32 months from announcing the change in pol-
icy to completing early implementation[8]. Malawi also
experienced significant delays during the times they have
changed their malaria treatment policies, with implemen-
tation lags of two to three years[9].
An interesting, unexpected benefit of conducting this
research and engaging key stakeholders in the process was
that those most involved in the process had not realized,
at the time, that what they were doing was essentially
changing policy. This revelation came to them only dur-
ing the retrospective review of their work. As they
explained:Malaria Journal 2009, 8:85 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/85
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"We didn't think of this as policy. It was a decision that had
to be made and we worked on it. You see, policy is normally
associated with politicians, often seen as troublemakers!"
"We do these things as routine behaviors and we do not
think about it. Yet, your questions [referring to the lead
author who was assisting the control program to document
their changes in policy] make us ask ourselves what we did.
Now we see the need to document and write this all down."
Limitations
There were several limitations to this retrospective study.
First, due to a variety of factors, field visits were not possi-
ble to the Northern Coast or the Amazon Region,
although a lengthy FGD was held in Lima with DISA rep-
resentatives from the Loreto area. Thus, perceptions from
the DISA level are limited. The study was limited to the
perspective from the major stakeholders and did not
include perceptions from the community. Another area in
which there was limited discussion relates to the process
of decentralization. During the time of data collection,
decentralization was in process, with specific Ministries
being decentralized at different times. The MoH was to be
one of the last to be decentralized, due to its size and com-
plexity. Thus, there are only scattered references to the
effect of decentralization on the process.
The analysis was based on a retrospective recall of events,
which could have produced recall bias. To account for
this, data triangulation was used, as it corrects for any
individual lapse by providing a collective memory that
has internal consistency.
Conclusion
Although not perfectly nor fully implemented as of March
2003, the change in malaria treatment policy in Peru
occurred very quickly, as compared to other countries.
While Peru demonstrated some unique approaches to the
process, they clearly shared common features noted in
policy changes completed in African countries[2,8,9].
Peru was a good example of how policy reform often
results from political negotiation among the stakehold-
ers[28].
Peru offers an excellent example for other countries to fol-
low as they contemplate their next process of anti-malar-
ial policy change. As best said by a former staff member of
the INS when discussing future policy changes:
"You cannot be afraid of challenges. On the contrary, you
must look for challenges. Demonstrate and validate
[through rigorous scientific evidence] your proposal. This is
the best way to convince even your enemies. Make a politi-
cal decision and take the power to make the change!"
Peru identified a problem, collected the data needed to
justify the change, utilized political will to their advan-
tage, gained the approval for a policy change and moved
ahead to improve malaria control in their country.
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